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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to study why some workers are paid more than others. To
do so we construct and quantitatively assess an equilibrium search model with on-the-job
search, general human capital accumulation and two sided heterogeneity. In the model work-
ers diﬀer in abilities and ﬁrms diﬀer in their productivities. The model generates a simple
(log) wage variance decomposition that is used to measure the importance of ﬁrm and worker
productivity diﬀerentials, frictional wage dispersion and workers’ sorting dynamics. We cal-
ibrate the model using a sample of young workers from the UK. We show that heterogeneity
among ﬁrms generates great deal of wage inequality. Among low skilled workers job ladder
eﬀects are small, most of the impact of experience on wages is due to learning-by-doing.
High skilled workers are much more mobile. Job ladder eﬀects have sizeable impact.
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1 Introduction
A major focus of Dale Mortensen’s work was on addressing the following question - Why are
workers, similar or otherwise, paid diﬀerently? Of course, several partial answers have long been
known. Diﬀerentials in worker abilities, for example, have long been recognized as an important
source of wage inequality. Human capital theory, pioneered by Becker (1964), explains why
years of education and other relevant ﬁxed factors play a role in explaining wage diﬀerences.
Following early work by Mincer (1974), many have also argued that learning-by-doing implies
workers accumulate more human capital while working. This implies that time in employment
may well play an important role in explaining wage diﬀerences among workers. Standard wage
regressions conﬁrm the importance of the above factors, but also show that a large proportion
of wage inequality is still left unexplained. Mortensen (2003) made a signiﬁcant contribution by
showing that when labour market frictions are suitably modelled wage inequality is a natural
equilibrium outcome.
As Mortensen (2003) demonstrated on the job search plays a central role in explaining wage
diﬀerences. If workers search while employed, the longer a worker is employed the greater the
probability she will ﬁnd and accept a higher paying job and this in itself can lead to inequality
(e.g. Burdett (1978), for early work in this area). In such a framework search frictions can
generate wage diﬀerentials among the employed even when workers and ﬁrms are identical (see,
for example, Burdett and Mortensen (1998), and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011)). Of
course, diﬀerence in the productivities of ﬁrms generate further wage diﬀerentials. Several
diﬀerent theories reach this conclusion (see, for example, Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002), and Bartelsman and Doms (2000)).
In this paper we assess the extent to which each of the factors mentioned above contribute to
overall wage inequality. We do this in the context of an equilibrium search model based on the
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework (henceforth B/M)), but allowing for human capital
accumulation as analysed in Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles (2011). The main innovations
relative to Burdett et al. (2011) is that here we (i) allow ﬁrms to diﬀer in their productivities
and (ii) use the resulting model as a measuring tool to assess the relative contributions of the
aforementioned factors on overall wage inequality. We use UK data and compare the relative
contributions of these factors across low, medium and high skilled workers. Diﬀerentiating across
skill groups is important since we ﬁnd that low skilled workers have a much more tenuous job
ladder than medium and high skilled workers. As shown below this diﬀerence has an important
eﬀect on the nature of wage inequality between these workers.
In the framework developed, employed workers of diﬀerent abilities enter the labour market,
accumulate general human capital through learning-by-doing as well as engaging in on-the-job
search.1 Firms post wage rates and in equilibrium diﬀerentiate their pay policies as an optimal
reaction to workers’ on-the-job search. In equilibrium more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher paying
jobs, wages increase over time as workers becomes more productive and move from less to more
productive jobs when the opportunity arises. These dynamics generate positive sorting among
1Our approach abstracts from life-cycle eﬀects on job search and wages. For recent work on this issue, see
Bowlus and Liu (2013) and Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2014).
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workers and ﬁrms. In equilibrium more productive workers end up employed in more productive
ﬁrms; and more productive ﬁrms end up employing a more productive workforce.
As argued by Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2014), an important issue is to
explain why wages, on average, increase with experience.2 Here we focus on decomposing the
cross-sectional wage distribution. Our model provides a simple variance decomposition that
relates (log) wages to diﬀerences in worker abilities, ﬁrm productivities and diﬀerences in pay
policies. We also capture the eﬀects of general human capital accumulation and sorting on wage
variation. Thus the model is able to encompass a similar variance decomposition as analysed by
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). At the same time the
model captures the eﬀects of labour market experience on wage variation as is the focus in the
traditional applied labour literature (see Rubinstein and Weiss, 2007, for an insightful survey).
This decomposition is a key element in our quantitative analysis and allows us to decompose
overall wage inequality into its constituent parts.3
Another contribution of this study is that we address the issues raised by Hornstein et al.
(2007, 2011). They deﬁne the Mm ratio as the ratio of the average wage earned to the lowest
wage paid in the market among equally productive workers. For plausible parameter values,
they explain why most search models generate a reservation wage that is too large to match the
observedMm ratio in the US economy. Within the framework developed here work experience is
valuable. Hence, unemployed workers are willing to accept low starting wages.4 Hornstein et al.
(2007, 2011) approach is important for it not only provides relevant information for calibrating
the model, it provides a coherent empirical framework for analysing wage dispersion. Indeed
our calibration approach follows closely their methodology.5
To quantitatively assess the factors behind wage inequality in our model we use labour
market histories of a sample of young workers drawn from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). We evaluate the model on young workers as it is precisely at this stage of a worker’s
labour market history that job mobility is most common. We divide the sample into the three
skill (educational) groups mentioned above and analyze them separately. We highlight two main
results.
First, our variance decomposition shows that the contribution of labour market experience
in accounting for wage inequality is sizeable and it increases across skill groups. For high skilled
workers it accounts for 27 percent of overall wage inequality, whereas for low skilled workers it
accounts for only 19 percent. This diﬀerence follows as low skilled workers are more likely to
move from one job to another via unemployment whereas high skilled workers are more likely
2Bagger et al. (2014) use the oﬀer-matching framework to structurally estimate how wages evolve at ﬁrms
when workers’ productivity also evolves stochastically.
3A diﬀerent approach uses statistical models, based on Mincer’s (1974) original work, to try to identify the
impact of experience on wages. Prominent examples include Topel (1991), Altonji and Williams (2007), Dustmann
and Meghir (2005), among many others. The evidence from this body work, however, remains hotly debated.
There are a few other papers which have investigated learning-by-doing within a search environment. Bunzel et
al. (2000) provide an interesting early example. Fu (2009), Yamaguchi (2010) and Bagger et al. (2014) provide
more recent examples. Manning (2003), Rubinstein and Weiss (2007), Barlevy (2008) and Bowlus and Liu (2013)
estimate a wage process similar to the one identiﬁed here but do not consider equilibrium.
4Indeed some college interns would seem to work for no pay in return for job experience.
5Also see Ortego-Marti (2012) and Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014) for related work on the Mm approach.
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to move from job to job via on-the-job search. Low skilled workers are also more likely to spent
long periods of time in unemployment, which hinders their ability to accumulate human capital.
Second, the variance decomposition shows that wage dispersion among equally productive
workers is large for all skill groups. Most of this dispersion arises due to ﬁrm productivity
diﬀerentials. Indeed an important conclusion from our work is that ﬁrm heterogeneity has a
very large impact on overall wage inequality. We ﬁnd that the contribution of ﬁrm productivity
diﬀerentials in explaining wage inequality decreases across skill groups, while the importance of
worker ability diﬀerences in explaining wage inequality increases across skill groups.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 deﬁnes
and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 describes the data, the calibration procedure and
present the main results. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
Time is continuous with an inﬁnite horizon and we only consider steady state. There is a
continuum of ﬁrms and workers, each of measure one. Any worker’s life is described by the
exponential distribution with parameter φ > 0. To keep the population of workers constant, φ
also describes the inﬂow of new labour market entrants.
A worker when entering the labour market has initial ability ε which is considered a ran-
dom draw from an exogenous distribution A(.) with support [ε, ε]. Learning-by-doing implies a
worker’s ability increases at rate ρ when working, where 0 < ρ < φ. Assuming an unemployed
worker’s productivity remains constant through time, a type ε worker with x years experience
has productivity y = εeρx.
Firms have a constant returns to scale technology and are ex-ante heterogeneous with ﬁxed
productivity parameter p. Let Γ(.) denote the exogenous distribution of productivities across
ﬁrms which, for ease of exposition we assume is diﬀerentiable [no mass points] with connected
support [p, p].
A worker with productivity y who is employed at a ﬁrm with productivity p generates ﬂow
revenue yp.6 We assume a ﬁrm pays each of its employees the same piece rate θ, and so a worker
y employed at ﬁrm p paying piece rate θ earns ﬂow wage w = θyp, the ﬁrm enjoys corresponding
ﬂow proﬁt (1 − θ)yp. Given the ﬁrm’s p and θ, however, it is convenient to deﬁne z = pθ as
its corresponding wage rate paid, where zy describes the wage paid to any employee y. We let
F (z) denote the fraction of ﬁrms which oﬀer wage rate no greater than z, with support denoted
[z, z]. F (.), of course, is endogenously determined.
Each unemployed and employed worker receives job oﬀers according to an exogenous Poisson
process with parameters λu and λe, respectively. Conditional on receiving a job oﬀer, random
matching implies F (z) describes the probability the oﬀered wage rate is no greater than z. If a
worker rejects a job oﬀer, there is no recall.
Each employed worker is displaced into unemployment at rate δ > 0. While unemployed, a
6An important simpliﬁcation is that the worker’s rate of human capital accumulation ρ is independent of the
workers productivity and that of her employer.
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worker with productivity y enjoys ﬂow payoﬀ by, where b denotes home productivity.
Workers are risk neutral, discount the future at rate r ≥ 0 and maximize expected discounted
lifetime income. Firms do not discount the future and so maximize steady state ﬂow proﬁt.
Optimal Search Strategies
For a given F , consider optimal worker behavior. Let WU (y) denote the maximum expected
lifetime payoﬀ of an unemployed worker with productivity y, let WE(y, z) denote the maximum
expected lifetime payoﬀ of a worker with productivity y employed at a ﬁrm paying wage rate z.
The Bellman equation implies WE(.) is deﬁned recursively by:
(r+φ)WE(y, z) = zy+ρy
∂WE
∂y
+λe
∫ z
z
[WE(y, z′)−WE(y, z)]dF (z′)+ δ [WU (y)−WE(y, z)] ,
where the second term describes the increase in value through learning-by-doing. It is immediate
that WE(.) must be strictly increasing in z. Hence any employee y quits to any outside oﬀer
z′ > z. Thus all employees adopt the same quit strategy and so the rate an employee leaves a
ﬁrm paying wage rate z is
q(z) = φ+ δ + λe(1− F (z)).
As there is no human capital accumulation while unemployed, the Bellman equation describ-
ing WU (y) is
(r + φ)WU (y) = by + λu
∫ z
z
max[WE(y, z′)−WU (y), 0]dF (z′).
As WE(y, z) is strictly increasing in z, an unemployed worker accepts job oﬀer z′ if and only
if WE(y, z′) ≥ WU (y). Thus an unemployed worker with productivity y adopts a reservation
wage strategy, where the worker’s reservation wage rate zR solves W
E(y, zR) ≥ WU (y).
As all workers are risk neutral and income and learning-by-doing are both proportional to
y, the solution to the above Bellman equations takes the separable form:
WU (y) = αUy, and WE(y, z) = αE(z)y,
where αU and αE(.) are determined below. The unemployed worker’s reservation wage rate zR
is now given by αE(zR) = α
U and so is independent of worker productivity y. Proposition 1
determines αU and αE(.).
Proposition 1: Given F (.), optimal job search implies
(i) αE(.) is the solution to the initial value problem:
dαE
dz
=
1
q(z) + r − ρ,
with αE(z) = (z + δαU )/(r + φ+ δ − ρ) at z = z,
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(ii) (αU , zR) satisfy the pair of equations:
ραU = b− zR + (λu − λe)
∫ z
zR
1− F (z)
q(z) + r − ρdz, (1)
(r + φ)αU = b+ λu
∫ z
zR
1− F (z)
q(z) + r − ρdz. (2)
Further z > b(r+φ− ρ)/(r+φ) implies a unique solution exists for αU , αE(.) and that αU > 0
and zR < z.
Using (1) and (2), the reservation wage rate zR is given by:
(r + φ)zR = b(r + φ− ρ) + [λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe]
∫ z
zR
1− F (z′)
q(z′) + r − ρdz
′. (3)
Given this characterisation of optimal worker behavior, we now consider optimal ﬁrm behavior.
Firm Proﬁts
Consider now the optimal wage setting strategy of a ﬁrm p when F describes the distribution
of wage rate oﬀers made by all other ﬁrms and unemployed workers adopt reservation wage rate
zR given by (3). As a ﬁrm with productivity p < zR can only make negative proﬁt, it cannot
be active in the labour market. Hence deﬁne p0 = max{zR, p} which describes the lowest
productivity ﬁrm which is active in the labour market. As 1 − Γ(p0) describes the measure of
active ﬁrms, those with p ≥ p0, then
Γ0(p) =
Γ(p)− Γ(p0)
1− Γ(p0) (4)
describes the distribution of ﬁrm productivities across active ﬁrms.
To characterise equilibrium, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne three steady-state objects conditional on
worker type ε: (a) Uε is the fraction of type ε workers who are unemployed, (b) Nε(y) is the
fraction of unemployed type ε workers with productivity no greater than y, and (c) Hε(y, z) is
the joint distribution function describing the probability that an employed type ε worker has
current ability no greater than y, employed at wage rate no greater than z.
We now compute Ω(z; p) deﬁned as steady state ﬂow proﬁt of a ﬁrm p which pays wage
rate z ≥ zR. The standard way of doing this is to integrate over the proﬁts generated by those
workers employed at the ﬁrm. With a zero discount rate, however, Burdett et al. (2011) show
steady state ﬂow proﬁt is more easily obtained by integrating over the inﬂow of new hires times
the expected lifetime proﬁt of each hire. Consider then a ﬁrm with productivity p which pays
wage rate z ≥ zR. If it hires a new employee with productivity y, the expected proﬁt from that
hire is (p− z)y/(q(z)− ρ) as the employee leaves the ﬁrm at rate q(z) and productivity y grows
at rate ρ as long as the employment relationship survives. The steady state ﬂow proﬁt of a ﬁrm
p is therefore:
Ω(z; p) =
∫ ε
ε
[
λuUε
λuUε+λe(1−Uε)
∫∞
y′=ε
(p−z)y′
q(z)−ρ dNε(y
′)
+ λe(1−Uε)λuUε+λe(1−Uε)
∫ z
z′=z
∫∞
y′=ε
(p−z)y′
q(z)−ρ dHε(y
′, z′)
]
dA(ε),
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where the ﬁrst term describes the proﬁts generated by recruiting new workers from the unem-
ployment pool, the second by attracting workers employed at ﬁrms paying a wage rate below
z.
For p ∈ [p0, p], deﬁne maximal proﬁt as Ω(p) = maxz≥zR Ω(z; p). Let Fp(z) denote the distri-
bution of wage rates oﬀered by ﬁrms with productivity p. We now formally deﬁne equilibrium.
A Market Equilibrium is a set {zR, Uε, Nε(.), Hε(., .), F (.), Fp(.)} for all ε ∈ [ε, ε] and p ∈
[p0, p] such that:
(i) the productivity distribution of active ﬁrms Γ0 is given by (4) with p0 = max{zR, p};
(ii) the constant proﬁt condition is satisﬁed for each ﬁrm type p ∈ [p0, p]; i.e.,
Ω(z; p) = Ω(p) for z where dFp(z) > 0;
Ω(z; p) ≤ Ω(p) for z where dFp(z) = 0,
(iii) where aggregation implies oﬀer distribution
F (z) =
∫ p
p0
Fp(z)dΓ0(p);
(iv) Uε, Nε(.) and Hε(., .) are consistent with steady state turnover, and
(v) zR solves the conditions in Proposition 1.
Given a Market Equilibrium exists it is simple to show (and has been shown many times in
the literature) that
(a) z = zR, and
(b) for each p ∈ [p0, p], Fp(.) must be continuous [no mass points].
Standard turnover arguments further imply unemployment rate Uε = U where
U =
φ+ δ
φ+ δ + λu
is the same for all ability types. Given this simpliﬁcation, Lemma 1 now solves for the market
distributions Nε(.) and Hε(.).
Lemma 1: A Market Equilibrium implies
Nε(y) = 1− λuδ
(φ+ λu)(φ+ δ)
(y
ε
)−(φ(φ+δ+λu)
ρ(φ+λu)
)
for all y ≥ ε,
Hε(y, z) =
(φ+ δ)F (z)
q(z)
[
1−
(y
ε
)− q(z)
ρ
]
(5)
− δλuF (z)
λuδ + λe(1− F (z))(φ+ λu)
[(y
ε
)−(φ(φ+δ+λu)
ρ(φ+λu)
)
−
(y
ε
)− q(z)
ρ
]
for all z ∈ [z, z] and y ≥ ε.
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A Market Equilibrium requires that a ﬁrm of productivity p ∈ [p0, p] chooses z ≤ p to
maximize Ω(z; p). Given Nε(.) and Hε(., .) identiﬁed in Lemma 1 the next result solves for
Ω(z; p).
Proposition 2: Steady state proﬁts are given by
Ω(z; p) = ε˜l(z)(p− z), (6)
where ε˜ = E{ε} and
l(z) =
φ(φ+ δ + λu)(φ+ δ − ρ)(φ+ δ + λe − ρ)
(q(z)− ρ)2(φ+ δ + λe)[φ(φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu)] .
As φ > ρ by assumption, a little algebra establishes that l(.) > 0 and is increasing in z for all
z ≥ z. As l′(.) > 0, it is straightforward to show that equilibrium implies more productive ﬁrms
oﬀer a strictly higher z. We let z = ζ(p) denote the equilibrium wage rate oﬀer strategy of ﬁrm
p in a market equilibrium and the above implies ζ(.) is strictly increasing. The oﬀer distribution
F thus solves F (z) = Γ0(ζ(p)). It is now straightforward to obtain a closed form solution for ζ.
Proposition 3: A Market Equilibrium implies
ζ(p) = p− [q(p)− ρ]2
∫ p
z
dx
[q(x)− ρ]2 . (7)
Note, the oﬀered ζ(p) described in (7) is derived for a given zR and p0. Showing an equilibrium
exists requires showing that zR solves the conditions in Proposition 1 given ζ satisﬁes Proposition
3 and that p0 = max{p, zR}. Given p0 and noting that in equilibrium F (ζ(p)) = Γ0(p), (3) and
(7) imply that zR solves T (zR; p0) = 0, where
T (zR; p0) ≡ (r + φ)zR − b(r + φ− ρ) (8)
− [λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe]
∫ p
p0
[
p0 − zR
(φ+ δ + λe − ρ)2 +
∫ x
p0
ds
(q(s)− ρ)2
]
β(x)dx,
and
β(x) =
2(q(x)− ρ)λe(1− Γ0(x))Γ′0(x)
q(x) + r − ρ > 0.
Denote zR(p0) the solution to T (zR; p0) = 0 for any p0. Since p0 = max{p, zR(p0)}, however,
there are two possible cases. First p0 = p if and only if p > zR(p). Otherwise, p0 > p and
some ﬁrms will not be active in the labour market. Given these results, we can now establish
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Theorem 1: There exists a unique Market Equilibrium.
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3 Implications
In a Market Equilibrium wages are dispersed as: (i) workers have disperse initial abilities; (ii)
productivity diﬀerences arise in the cross section as workers diﬀer (by age and thus) by labour
market experience; (iii) there are diﬀerences in wages paid due to search frictions and labour
market sorting. The aim of the calibration is to quantify the relative importance of each of
these factors when explaining wage inequality. We focus the discussion by commenting on four
particular implications of the model.
The model identiﬁes the following wage equation for worker i with initial ability εi, experience
xit at date t and employment at ﬁrm j paying wage rate zj :
logwijt = ρxit + log zj + log εi. (9)
In contrast to a large fraction of the empirical labour literature, this wage equation contains a
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. From the worker’s perspective, that ﬁxed eﬀect zj is the realised outcome to
a stochastic search process. As the implied quit process is not random (an employee at ﬁrm j
only quits to an outside oﬀer paying a higher wage rate z > zj), such turnover has important
empirical implications both for individual wage dynamics and cross-sectional wage inequality.
1. Decomposing experience eﬀects on wages
The classic explanation for why wages increase with experience is that there is learning-
by-doing and so more experienced workers (being more productive) earn higher wages. But
on-the-job search with no learning-by-doing also predicts that wages, on average, increase with
experience (e.g. Burdett, 1978, Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). Conditional on experience, the
wage equation (9) implies expected log wage:
E(logw | x) = ρx+ E(log z | x) + E(log ε). (10)
It is straightforward to show E(log z | x) is increasing and concave in experience.7 One important
aim of the calibration is to evaluate how much of the observed impact of experience on wages is
due to each of these processes.
2. Equilibrium sorting
Equilibrium implies more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher wage rates z. As equilibrium search
7Integration by parts implies
E(log z | x) = log zR +
∫ z
zR
1−H(z | x)
z
dz.
As y = εeρx, each ﬁrm p uses strategy z = ζ(p) and so F (ζ(p)) = Γ0(p), it can be shown that
H(z | x) = F (z)
⎡
⎢⎣λuδ + λe(1− F (z))(φ+ λu)e
−
(
λuδ+λe(1−F (z))(φ+λu)
(φ+λu)
)
x
λuδ + λe(1− F (z))(φ+ λu)
⎤
⎥⎦ .
As ∂H(z | x)/∂x < 0 and ∂2H(z | x)/∂x2 > 0, it is easily established that E(log z | x) is an increasing and
concave function of experience.
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also implies E(log z | x) is increasing in x, there is positive assortative matching between the
productivity of a ﬁrm and the average experience (and thus average productivity) of its work-
force. Such sorting increases wage inequality. For example, older workers tend to earn more not
only because they are more experienced and so more productive, they are also more likely to be
employed at more productive ﬁrms which pay higher wage rates. Indeed, a little algebra estab-
lishes that the probability a worker with initial ability ε and current productivity y is employed
at a ﬁrm with productivity no greater than p, Hε(p | y), is ﬁrst order stochastically increasing in
y; i.e. ∂Hε(. | y)/∂y < 0. Given λu ≥ λe, the distribution of worker productivities employed at
ﬁrms with productivity p conditional on these workers having an initial ability of ε, Hε(y | p),
is ﬁrst order stochastically increasing in p; i.e. ∂Hε(. | p)/∂p < 0.8
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) develop a theory on how to identify sorting in assignment
models. In our model workers’ initial abilities, ε, are uncorrelated with ﬁrms’ productivities, p,
as is typically found in regressions using the Abowd et al. (1999) methodology. The sorting
allocation highlighted in this paper is driven by experience eﬀects. In our framework workers’
productivities are an evolving endogenous variable that correlates with ﬁrms’ productivities
because of on-the-job search. One way of incorporating sorting by types, as in the assignment
model, would be to allow workers to choose their search eﬀort as a function of their initial
abilities (see Lentz, 2010). Bagger and Lentz (2015) show that the latter type of sorting is an
important determinant of wage inequality. Below we show that the sorting generated by our
theory also has important implications for wage inequality.
3. Variance decomposition of log wages
As experience eﬀects (xit) and job search outcomes (zj) are both independent of initial ability
εi, the wage equation (9) implies the following variance decomposition of log wages:
var(logw) = ρ2var(x) + var(log z) + 2ρcov(log z, x) + var(log ε). (11)
The ﬁrst term describes the contribution of learning-by-doing and disperse labour market ex-
periences in explaining wage inequality. The second and third terms describe how variations in
wage rates across ﬁrms aﬀect wage inequality. A perfectly competitive market would imply both
of these terms are zero (the law of one price). Search frictions instead generate disperse wage
rates z, where the third term describes the added wage inequality generated by sorting (that
higher productivity ﬁrms tend to employ more experienced workers). The last term attributes
the wage dispersion that is otherwise not captured by the model as unobserved dispersion in
worker abilities.
As z = θp, one can further decompose the dispersion in ﬁrm wage rates as
var(log z) = var(log θ) + var(log p) + cov(log p, log θ). (12)
8We omit the derivations of these results as they are similar to the ones found in Burdett et al. (2011). It is
important to note that these sorting results rely on the assumed positive complementarity between workers’ and
ﬁrms’ productivities. See Lentz (2010) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), among others, for an analysis of sorting
using a more general production function.
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The ﬁrst term captures the variation in wage rates that arises when there is no ﬁrm heterogeneity
(e.g. Burdett et al., 2011). The issue then is how important is ﬁrm heterogeneity in explaining
wage dispersion? An important feature of the model is that there is piece rate compression:
although more productive ﬁrms pay higher wage rates, they do not increase wages so much
that they increase the piece rate paid θ = z/p. This is not entirely surprising as the perfectly
competitive case implies perfect piece rate compression - that all ﬁrms pay the same wage rate
regardless of productivity p. Taking piece rate compression into account, we must add the second
and third terms in (12) together and so identify the net eﬀect of ﬁrm heterogeneity on frictional
wage inequality. It turns out this net eﬀect is large: ﬁrm heterogeneity has a large impact on
wage dispersion.
4. The Mm ratio
The Mm ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the average wage earned to the lowest wage paid
in the market among equally productive workers. For plausible parameter values, Hornstein
et al. (2011) explain why most search models generate a reservation wage that is too high to
match the observed Mm ratio in the US economy. That paper does not, however, consider
a model with both on-the-job search and learning-by-doing as done in Burdett et. al (2011).
With both features present, the on-the-job search framework easily generates empirically rele-
vant Mm ratios: unemployed workers are willing to accept low starting wages as experience is
valuable.9 Here we use information on the Mm ratio to usefully calibrate the model. Using the
approximation method described in Hornstein et al. (2011), Lemma 2 relates the Mm ratio to
the fundamentals of the model.
Lemma 2: Given a market equilibrium, the Mm ratio can be well approximated as
Mm ∼=
[
1 +
λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe
(r + φ)(r + φ+ δ + λe − ρ)
]
/
[
r + φ− ρ
r + φ
b
zM
+
λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe
(r + φ)(r + φ+ δ + λe − ρ)
]
,
(13)
where zM is the average z earned by employed workers.
4 Quantitative Analysis
We calibrate the model using simulated methods of moments to match salient features of the
UK labour market using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
Data
The BHPS is an annual survey of individuals, age 16 years or more, in a nationally repre-
sentative sample of about 5,500 households. Approximately 10,000 individuals are interviewed
9Hornstein et. al (2011) adopt as baseline calibration values λu = 0.43, δ = 0.03, b/z
M = 0.4, r = 0.0041,
φ = 0.0021. In addition, they set λe = 0.13 to quantify the Mm ratio obtained from a model with on-the-job
search, but without learning-by-doing. They set ρ = 0.0017 to quantify the Mm ratio obtained from a model with
learning-by-doing, but without on-the-job search. When using all these parameters values in the model presented
here we obtain an Mm = 1.49, a ratio which is within the bounds of the estimated Mm ratios, presented in
Hornstein et al. (2007).
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each year. It started in 1991 and was subsumed by the new and bigger survey “Understanding
Society” in 2010. The BHPS contains socioeconomic information, including information about
household organization, the labour market, income and wealth, housing, health and socioeco-
nomic values. Using this information one is able to reconstruct the labour market histories
of individuals since leaving full-time education. Mare´ (2006) provides a comprehensive guide
on how to derive consistent histories that summarize individual’s transitions between employ-
ment, unemployment and non-participation; transitions between jobs; occupational and industry
changes; actual and potential work experience; wages and hours worked; and several socio eco-
nomic characteristics that are standard in household survey data.
We construct individual labour market histories following Mare´’s (2006) procedure, consid-
ering only white male workers. To focus on young workers we consider those individuals that
were originally sampled in 1991 and were between 16 and 30 years of age at that time. We
construct their entire employment history since leaving full-time education using retrospective
work history information and follow these workers over time until 2004 (or earlier if they left the
sample before). We then stratify the sample of workers into three educational or skill groups.
We consider workers to be low skilled if they reported having no qualiﬁcation, other qualiﬁca-
tions, apprenticeship, CSE, commercial qualiﬁcations or no O-levels. Medium skilled workers are
those who reported having O-level or equivalent qualiﬁcations. High skilled workers are those
that achieved A-levels, nursing qualiﬁcations, teaching qualiﬁcations, university degree or higher
and other higher qualiﬁcations.10 We further restrict attention to paid (dependent) full-time
employment spells in the private sector and unemployment spells that lasted at least one month.
To keep the sample as homogeneous as possible we only consider those employment and unem-
ployment spells that occur before an individual reported he became (if at all) self-employed, a
civil servant, worked for the central or a local government or the armed forces, long-term sick
or entered retirement. We also dropped those individuals that re-entered full-time education or
had a spell in government training.
These restrictions leave us with a sample of 1,867 individuals, where 486 are considered low
skilled, 658 medium skilled and 723 high skilled. We assume that an individual changed jobs if
he changed employer. A change in employer is identiﬁed when the worker declared a change in
his 2-digit occupation and 2-digit industry. In principle, this could underestimate the number of
jobs an individual holds during his working life as he can change jobs within the same employer.
However, to be consistent with the theory, we consider job-to-job transitions as employer-to-
employer transitions.11 We consider as our earnings variable the real hourly (gross) wage of
these individuals.12 We trim the wage data by 5 percent on each side to reduce measurement
10See Dustmann and Pereira (2008) for a similar classiﬁcation using the BHPS. The main diﬀerence is that we
consider those workers with nursing qualiﬁcations, teaching qualiﬁcations and A-levels as high skilled workers.
We do this to have somewhat an even number of workers in each skill group.
11Since we do not count spells that are shorter than a month a transition in which the individual changed
employer but experienced an intervening spell of unemployment of less than a month is considered a direct job-
to-job transition. If the individual experiences an unemployment spell longer than a month, then he is considered
unemployed. See Jolivet et al. (2006) for a similar assumption.
12Following Dustmann and Pereira (2008), we construct real hourly wages by dividing monthly (gross) earnings
by 4.33 weeks and then by the average number of hours worked in a week in full-time jobs. We also take into
account overtime hours and use the CPI to deﬂate nominal wages.
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error and to consider all jobs that pay above the national minimum wage, introduced in the UK
in 1999. It is worth pointing out that wage data is only available as from 1991, the ﬁrst wave of
the BHPS. Overall there are 12,091 spells in the sample, where 3,434 of those are associated with
low skilled workers, 4,382 are associated with medium skilled workers and 4,275 are associated
with high skilled workers.
4.1 Calibration
We consider the reference time period as a month. Following Hornstein et al. (2011), we let
r = 0.0041 and ﬁx φ = 0.0021 so that workers participate in the labour market, on average, for 40
years. We approximate the ﬁrm productivity and worker ability distributions using (truncated)
Weibull distributions. Let κ1, κ2 and p describe the shape, scale and location parameters,
respectively, of the productivity distribution among ﬁrms; and α1, α2 and ε describe the shape,
scale and location parameters, respectively, of the worker ability distribution.
This parameterization leaves a set of 13 parameters, Ψ = {δ, λu, λe, ρ, p, p, κ1, κ2, b, ε, ε, α1, α2}
to be estimated. To do this, we minimize the sum of squared distances between a set of simulated
moments from the model and their counterparts in the data.
Table 1: Targeted Moments
Moments Low Skilled Medium Skilled High Skilled
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Average durations (months)
Unemp spell 12.35 12.15 8.42 8.32 5.87 5.84
Employment spell 41.63 43.77 68.63 68.26 71.00 70.50
Job spell 35.68 37.03 43.26 43.90 45.76 44.58
Returns to experience (%)
2 years 7.67 6.65 7.92 7.07 9.12 8.19
4 years 14.62 12.86 14.94 13.75 17.35 15.88
6 years 20.85 18.62 21.06 20.06 24.67 23.05
8 years 26.36 23.94 26.27 25.98 31.09 29.71
10 years 31.15 28.81 30.59 31.51 36.61 35.86
Wage Dispersion
Mm ratio 1.48 1.44 1.52 1.55 1.51 1.45
mean(log w) 0 -5.71E-03 0 9.51E-03 0 -2.14E-02
var(log w) 0.089 0.088 0.082 0.079 0.094 0.098
Skewness(log w) 0.027 -0.114 0.013 -0.095 -0.049 -0.265
Kurtosis(log w) 3.196 2.618 2.987 2.671 3.004 3.013
log(w) -0.991 -0.954 -0.968 -1.018 -1.287 -1.217
log(w) 1.048 0.887 0.904 0.960 1.024 1.044
Targeted Moments We target 15 moments based on the main characteristics of the labour
market to which the model is directly related. Table 1 describes these moments decomposed by
skill group (low, medium, high) as described above.13
13The targeted moments are compared with the corresponding moments from model simulations for diﬀerent
values of the parameters in Ψ until the loss functions described above is minimised. For each model simulation
13
To identify wage dispersion from the data, we build on the approach of Hornstein et al.
(2007). For each skill group, a regression of log wages is run on a dummy for marital status, 8
regional dummies, 8 (one-digit) occupational dummies, 8 (one-digit) industry dummies, dummies
for cohort eﬀects and a time trend. The resulting log wage residual is then used as our measure of
wage dispersion. The empirical wage experience proﬁle is identiﬁed by regressing log wages on a
quadratic on experience, a quadratic on tenure, a dummy for marital status, 8 regional dummies,
8 (one-digit) occupational dummies, 8 (one-digit) industry dummies, dummies for cohort eﬀects
and a time trend.14 To obtain the empirical Mm ratio we follow the procedure of Hornstein et
al. (2007), which involves controlling for worker ﬁxed eﬀects in the experience regression. In
the Appendix, we discuss this procedure in more detail. The calibration requires not only that
the model is consistent with the observed log wage residuals across workers (by skill group) but
also with the estimated experience eﬀects and the empirical Mm ratio. A minor diﬃculty with
this approach is that the mean log wage residual is zero for each skill group. Below we will
ﬁnd that high skilled workers have longer employment spells, are employed in more productive
ﬁrms, spend less time in unemployment, etc. The calibration requires each skill group to have
the same average log wage residual. It thus compensates by attributing a higher mean worker
ability ε to the lowest skill group. Clearly computing mean ability by skill group requires also
taking into account the occupational and location dummies used in the original regression. This
is not straightforward as one must adopt a theory of how diﬀerent ability workers select into
diﬀerent occupations (lumberjack or accountant) and locations (Sherwood Forest or London).
Fortunately this issue does not otherwise distort our results as equilibrium market behaviour is
independent of the assumed distribution of abilities ε. In essence the unobserved worker ability
distribution captures the variation in the data (by skill group) that is not otherwise explained
by the model.
Key features of the data described in Table 1 ﬁnd the low skilled group (compared to the high
skilled group) has longer average unemployment spells (one year compared to 6 months), shorter
average employment spells (3.5 years compared to 6 years) but average job spells which are not so
diﬀerent (3 years compared to 3.75 years). This latter statistic arises as high skilled workers have
much higher quit rates. Such turnover provides direct information on the transition parameters δ,
λu and λe. As the parameters that govern worker turnover, human capital accumulation and the
ﬁrm productivity distribution, determine the shape of the wage-experience proﬁle, information
run, we set b = 0.4zM , following Hornstein et al. (2011), to jointly recover the values of zR, z
M and b using
(8) and (19). Further, the simulated data is constructed such that it has the same structure as the BHPS for
consistent measurement. See the Appendix for further details of the simulation procedure.
14One potential worry with the above speciﬁcation is that workers’ unobservable characteristics might be biasing
the estimated returns to general experience because, for example, more able workers could be more likely to receive
outside oﬀers than less able workers in the data. The results of Dustmann and Pereira (2008), however, suggest
that any potential bias of this sort is very small. These authors estimate returns to experience for the UK using
the BHPS by skill/education categories. When controlling for worker and job match (unobservable) ﬁxed eﬀects,
their estimated experience eﬀects hardly change across speciﬁcation and estimation methods. See also Williams
(2009). Furthermore, as suggested by Dustmann and Pereira (2008) and Williams (2009) we incorporate yearly
dummies into the wage regressions to control for the presence of a macro trend. We ﬁnd that the latter is
important for high and medium skilled workers as without it the estimated returns to experience nearly double in
size. In addition we also incorporate cohort dummies into our wage regressions. In this case, we ﬁnd that these
dummies have a very small impact on the estimated returns to experience across skill groups.
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on the average wage-experience proﬁle also helps tie down parameter values. We also incorporate
information on the distribution of (residual) log wages.
Table 1 shows the ﬁt of the model is very good and has no diﬃculty in matching the em-
pirical Mm ratios or the cross-sectional wage distribution. What is of central interest now is
understanding how the labour market diﬀers across skill groups and identifying the impact of job
search and learning-by-doing on (i) average wage proﬁles by experience and (ii) wage inequality.
Table 2: Parameter values
Low Medium High
Skilled Skilled Skilled
Parameters
λu 0.082 0.121 0.171
δ 0.021 0.012 0.012
λe 0.010 0.038 0.039
ρ 0.0018 0.0016 0.0020
p 3.049 6.950 9.810
κ1 0.5908 0.5040 0.403
κ2 0.4018 0.4033 0.403
p 25.176 25.222 28.349
b 0.808 2.701 3.889
ε 0.267 0.089 0.041
α1 1.222 0.906 1.770
α2 2.320 1.564 1.563
ε 0.560 0.174 0.116
Endog. variables
zR 1.405 4.284 6.718
urate 0.217 0.105 0.077
Pr EE 0.004 0.011 0.011
Parameters
Table 2 describes the calibrated parameter values for each skill group. Those values present a
picture that is similar to the one identiﬁed in Steward (2007). Relative to the high skilled group,
low skilled workers spend more time in unemployment and there is little upward job mobility
through job-to-job transitions.15 As they spend long periods in unemployment, low skilled
worker also accumulate less human capital through learning-by-doing and so earned wages are
likely to remain low into the longer term. In contrast, high skilled workers can more quickly
ﬁnd work while unemployed, enjoy much greater job security and enjoy a much greater chance
of receiving (and quitting to) an attractive outside oﬀer.16
15The job-to-job transition rate is computed using
PrEE = (φ+ δ)
[(
1 +
φ+ δ
λe
)
ln
(
1 +
λe
φ+ δ
)
− 1
]
,
The rate at which a high skilled worker receives a preferred outside oﬀer is three times that of a low skilled worker.
16These job reallocation patterns also reﬂect that medium and high skilled employed workers face less search
frictions than low skilled workers. Using k = λe/(φ + δ) as a measure of the extent of search frictions faced
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Figure 1: Oﬀered z and θ as functions of ﬁrm productivities
Figure 1 depicts the wage rate, z, and piece rate, θ, functions generated by the model. These
wage rate functions characterise workers’ “job” ladders. Workers of diﬀerent skills jump into
their respective job ladders with their ﬁrst oﬀer from unemployment and then move up as they
receive acceptable outside oﬀers when employed. Job destruction shocks reset this process by
bringing workers back to unemployment. From the ﬁgure it is immediate that the height of the
job ladder is increasing in workers’ skills, such that high skilled workers are able to access higher
job ladders than medium and low skilled workers. We discuss the returns of climbing these job
ladders in the next subsections.
The values of zr in Table 2 imply p0 = p and hence all ﬁrms at the left tail of the produc-
tivity distribution ﬁnd it proﬁtable to participate in the labour market. This arises because
unemployed workers are willing to accept a low wage rate to become employed and accumulate
work experience. We ﬁnd that this “foot-in-the-door” eﬀect is more pronounced for low skilled
workers.17
Furthermore, the values of {p, κ1, κ2, p} imply that high skilled workers face a ﬁrm produc-
tivity distribution that is to the right of the distribution faced by medium skilled workers; while
the latter distribution is, in turn, to the right of the ﬁrm productivity distribution faced by low
skilled workers.18 This characteristic implies that on average low skilled workers access jobs
by employed workers and noting that a higher value implies lower search frictions, the estimated transitions
parameters imply that low skilled workers face 6 times more search frictions relative to medium and high skilled
workers.
17If one were to counterfactually set ρ = 0, the reservation zr for low skilled workers would be 28.11 percent
higher than the value reported in Table 1; while for medium and high skilled workers it would be 16.71 and 21.17
precent higher, respectively.
18This result mainly arises due to diﬀerences in the returns to experience, values of the Mm ratio and the
extent of search frictions we observed across skill groups. In the case of low and medium skilled workers, for
example, to match similar wage-experience proﬁles and Mm ratios in a context in which medium skilled workers
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in ﬁrms with lower productivities than medium and high skilled workers. As discussed below,
the θ functions depicted in Figure 1 imply that low skilled workers also face stronger piece rate
compression than medium and high skilled workers.
Decomposing the experience eﬀect on wages
Recall that the expected log wage conditional on experience is
E(logw | x) = ρx+ E(log z | x) + E(log ε).
For the low skilled group, the calibration ﬁnds that 88% of the experience eﬀect on wages is
due to learning-by-doing. The rationale is twofold. First learning-by-doing rates are reasonably
large (comparable in value to the learning-by-doing rates of the high skilled). Second the low
skilled are unlikely to climb the job ladder: their job destruction rate (δ = 0.021 per month)
is not only high, it is 5 times greater than the (average) rate at which low skilled workers quit
to preferred outside oﬀers (P (EE) = 0.004 per month). In other words each unskilled worker,
when employed, is far more likely to return to the unemployment pool than climb the job ladder.
For the high skilled group, the job ladder plays a more important role: the calibration ﬁnds
69% of the experience eﬀect on wages is due to human capital accumulation. Although learning-
by-doing continues to explain the larger part of wage growth by experience, on-the-job search
plays a more sizeable role.
This interpretation of the data is entirely consistent with the ﬁndings of Bagger et al. (2014)
and Menzio, et al. (2014) who suggest that, among young workers, human capital accumulation
plays a more important role than job-to-job transitions in explaining average wage diﬀerentials.
This does not mean, however, that search plays little role in explaining wage inequality.
The variance decomposition of wage inequality by skill group
Table 3: Variance decomposition of log (w)
var(log w) var(logε) ρ2 var(x) var(logz) 2ρcov(x,logz)
Low Skill 0.088 0.016 0.015 0.055 0.002
Total=100% 18.2% 17.1% 62.5% 2.3%
Medium Skill 0.079 0.018 0.011 0.043 0.007
Total=100% 22.8% 13.9% 54.4% 8.9%
High Skill 0.098 0.030 0.018 0.042 0.008
Total=100% 30.6% 18.4% 42.9% 8.2%
Table 3 describes the variance decomposition implied by (11): Column 1 describes the total
variation in log wages for each skill group, the remaining columns decompose that variation
face lower search frictions, the calibration adjusts by given low skilled workers a higher value of ρ but lower job
productivity relative to medium skilled workers. For high skilled workers, however, higher returns to experience
and low search frictions imply both a higher value of ρ and higher job productivity relative to low and medium
skilled workers.
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using (11). Not surprisingly unobserved worker heterogeneity [column 2] explains a large chunk
of the observed wage dispersion, ranging from 18% for the unskilled group to 31% for the high
skilled group. Dispersion in labour market experience with learning-by-doing [column 3] also
contributes a signiﬁcant amount to wage inequality, ranging between 14% to 18% depending on
skill groups. In all cases, however, the largest contributor to wage inequality is the dispersion in
wage rates paid by ﬁrms. We discuss this further below. The ﬁnal column describes the eﬀect
of positive sorting on wage inequality. Reﬂecting that job ladder eﬀects are small for the low
skilled, sorting only contributes 2.3% to total wage inequality for these workers. For the higher
skill groups, sorting instead contributes around 8-9% to total wage variation.
Table 4: Variance decomposition of log (z)
var(logz) var(logθ) var(logp) cov(logp,logθ)
Low Skill 0.055 0.020 0.060 -0.024
62.5% 22.7% 68.2% -27.3%
Medium Skill 0.043 0.014 0.045 -0.016
54.4% 17.7% 57.0% -20.2%
High Skill 0.042 0.014 0.049 -0.021
42.9% 14.3% 50.0% -21.4%
Table 4 now uses (12) to decompose the variation in ﬁrm wage rates z = θp and so identify
the impact of ﬁrm heterogeneity on wage inequality. The ﬁrst column reports the variation in
ﬁrm wage rates as described in the previous table. Note the law of one price would imply zero
variation (no ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects). The second column describes the wage rate dispersion that is
attributable to pure non-competitive wage formation when ﬁrms are identical (e.g. Burdett et
al., 2011). This component accounts for between 14-22% of observed wage inequality. Taking
the last two columns together (where the last column describes piece rate compression), the
added (net) eﬀect of ﬁrm heterogeneity on total wage inequality is very large, being as high as
41% for the low skilled group (68%-27%) and 29% for the high skilled group (50%-21%). Thus
ﬁrm heterogeneity has a very large impact on overall wage inequality, an eﬀect which is missing
in competitive markets.
Note that piece rate compression on its own is an important component of the variation in
ﬁrm wage rates. For all skill groups, Figure 1.b shows that oﬀered piece rates initially increase
and then decrease with ﬁrm productivities. This property implies that, except for ﬁrms in the
left tail of the productivity distribution, there is a positive relation between ﬁrm productivity
and their level of monopsony power. This is similar to the result obtained by Bontemps et al.
(2000). They ﬁnd that, except for very low productive ﬁrms in some sectors, more productive
ﬁrms have higher values of the monopsony power index 1−w(p)/p, where w(.) is an increasing
function that associates oﬀered wages to ﬁrm of productivity. In our context their monopsony
power index can be expressed as 1− θ(p), which increases with p for high enough productivities.
Since piece rate compression is stronger among low skilled workers, our results imply that ﬁrms
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exert higher monopsony power on low skilled workers than on medium and high skilled workers.
5 Further Discussion
The framework developed in this paper is nicely tractable and seems well suited to understand
the various causes of wage inequality. The empirical investigation presented yielded several new
insights. Three seem particularly worthy of restating. First, heterogeneity among ﬁrms generates
a lot of wage inequality. Second, among low skilled workers job ladder eﬀects are small, most of
the impact of experience on wages is due to learning-by-doing. Third, high skilled workers are
much more mobile. Job ladder eﬀects have sizeable impact.
In related work, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) estimate their sequential auction model
without human capital accumulation to analyse the relative contribution of worker ex-ante het-
erogeneity (abilities), ﬁrm ex-ante heterogeneity (productivities) and search frictions in overall
wage inequality using French data. In line with their results, we also ﬁnd that the importance of
ﬁrm productivities diﬀerentials in explaining wage inequality decreases with skill groups; while
the importance of worker ability diﬀerentials increases with skill groups.19 More recently Bagger
and Lentz (2015) estimate a version of the Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) model that allows for
sorting between worker initial abilities and ﬁrm productivities (see Lentz, 2010). Although our
models generate sorting in a diﬀerent way, we ﬁnd that the contribution of sorting in explaining
wage inequality for medium and high skilled workers is of the same order of magnitude as the
one Bagger and Lentz (2015) ﬁnd when estimating their model on Danish data.
An important assumption in our framework is that ﬁrms are restricted to post constant wage
rate contracts. This assumption is not innocuous as ﬁrms would have an incentive to post wage
contracts that depend on their applicants’ experience (see Carrillo-Tudela, 2009). Given risk
neutrality, these contracts can be characterised by promotion or step contracts as ﬁrm would
want to backload wages to reduce workers’ quit probabilities. Allowing for wage-experience
contracts in our framework would have an impact on the variance decomposition results as we
will have to take into account the wage growth associated with these contracts as well as its
interaction with human capital accumulation. Although allowing for this type of contracts is
appealing, the analysis in Carrillo-Tudela (2009) and Burdett and Coles (2010) suggests that
such an extension becomes intractable in the presence of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
In this paper we have also restricted our analysis to an economy that is in steady state.
An important question, however, is to what extent the employment patterns and the relative
contributions of worker ability diﬀerentials, ﬁrm productivity diﬀerentials, and frictional wage
dispersion change over the business cycle. Recent work by Coles and Mortensen (2012) suggests
that such an extension is possible. We leave this important extension for future research.
19Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) ﬁnd that the contribution of worker ex-ante heterogeneity is more important
in those occupations that one would consider require higher qualiﬁcation levels (e.g. “Executives, managers
and engineers” or “Supervisors, administrative and sales”); while the importance of ﬁrm productivity is more
important in those occupations that one would consider require lower qualiﬁcation levels (e.g. “Sales and service
workers” and “Unskilled manual workers”).
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
Given the functional forms for WU and WE , the Bellman equation describing WU is equiv-
alent to
(r + φ)αU = b+ λu
∫ z
zR
[αE(z′)− αU ]dF (z′) (14)
and the Bellman equation for WE is equivalent to
(r + φ+ δ)αE(z) = z + ραE(z) + λe
∫ z
z
[αE(z′)− αE(z)]dF (z′) + δαU , (15)
which is a functional equation for αE(.). Diﬀerentiating (15) with respect to z yields the diﬀer-
ential equation describing αE and evaluating (15) at z = z yields its boundary value αE(z).
We now solve the conditions for zR and α
U . First evaluate (15) at z = zR. As α
E(zR) = α
U
one obtains
(r + φ)αU = zR + ρα
U + λe
∫ z
zR
[αE(z′)− αU ]dF (z′).
Comparing this equation with (14), integrating by parts and using the diﬀerential equation for
αE establishes (1) described in Proposition 1. Similarly, αE(zR) = α
U , integration by parts and
using the diﬀerential equation for αE then yields (2) in Proposition 1. Thus (1) and (2) describe
a pair of equations for (αU , zR).
We now establish that a solution exists and is unique. First note that the equation described
by (1) has slope [
dαU
dzR
]
eqn(1)
= −1
ρ
[
r + φ+ δ + λu(1− F (zR))− ρ
q(zR) + r − ρ
]
< 0
and implies αU = (b − z)/ρ at zR = z. On the other hand, the equation described by (2) has
slope [
dαU
dzR
]
eqn(2)
= − 1
r + φ
[
λu(1− F (zR))
q(zR) + r − ρ
]
< 0,
for zR < z and zero otherwise and implies that α
U = b/(r + φ) at zR = z. Note that[
dαU
dzR
]
eqn(2)
>
[
dαU
dzR
]
eqn(1)
for all zR and hence (2) is always ﬂatter than (1). Continuity of (1) and (2) and the restriction
z > b(r+φ−ρ)/(r+φ) then guarantee there exists a single crossing between these two functions
such that αU > 0 and zR < z.‖
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider the pool of type ε unemployed workers with productivity no greater that y. It is
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straightforward to verify that steady-state turnover implies
Nε(y) =
φ (φ+ δ + λu) + δλuHε(y, z)
(φ+ λu)(φ+ δ)
for all y ≥ ε. Next consider the pool of type ε employed workers who have productivity no
greater than y and receive a payoﬀ no greater than z. The arguments in Burdett et al. (2011)
imply that Hε(., .) satisﬁes the following partial diﬀerential equation,
∂Hε(y, z)
∂y
+
q(z)
ρy
Hε(y, z) =
(φ+ δ)F (z)Nε(y)
ρy
, (16)
for z ∈ [z, z] and y ≥ ε. For a given z, integrating over y using the integrating factor y
q(z)
ρ and
noting that Hε(ε, z) = 0 yields
Hε(y, z) =
(φ+ δ)F (z)
ρ
y
− q(z)
ρ
∫ y
ε
y
′ q(z)
ρ
−1
Nε(y
′)dy′
for all y ≥ ε, z ∈ [z, z].
Using these formulae we now solve for steady state Nε(.) and Hε(., .). In particular, using
the above expression for Nε(.) and simplifying yields
∂Hε(y, z)
∂y
=
φ (φ+ δ + λu)
ρ(φ+ λu)
1−Hε(y, z)
y
for all y ≥ ε. As this diﬀerential equation is separable and we have the boundary condition
Hε(ε, z) = 0, integration implies
Hε(y, z) = 1−
(y
ε
)−(φ(φ+δ+λu)
ρ(φ+λu)
)
.
Using this and simplifying yields the expression for Nε(.). Using the latter to substitute out
Nε(.) in the above expression for Hε(y, z), direct integration and some algebra then establishes
(5).‖
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider a ﬁrm with productivity p oﬀering z ≥ zR. This ﬁrm’s steady state proﬁt is given
by
Ω(z; p) =
p− z
(q(z)− ρ)(λuU + λe(1− U))
∫ ε
ε
[
λuU
∫ ∞
y′=ε
y′dNε(y′) + λe(1− U)
∫ ∞
y′=ε
∫ z
z′=z
y′
∂2Hε(y
′, z′)
∂y′∂z′
dz′dy′
]
dA(ε).
Next use the results in Lemma 1 to solve for the integrals in Ω(z; p). Consider the ﬁrst integral
in the expression in brackets. Using the expression for Nε one obtains
∫ ∞
y′=ε
y′dNε(y′) = εNε(ε) +
∫ ∞
ε
(
φ (φ+ δ + λu)
ρ(φ+ λu)
)
λuδ
(φ+ λu)(φ+ δ)
(
y′
ε
)−(φ(φ+δ+λu)
ρ(φ+λu)
)
dy′.
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Integration and some algebra then establish that∫ ∞
y′=ε
y′dNε(y′) =
φ (φ+ δ + λu) ε
(φ+ δ)
[
(φ+ δ − ρ)
φ (φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu)
]
.
Next consider the second integral in Ω(z; p). Integrating over z′ implies∫ ∞
y′=ε
∫ z
z′=z
y
∂2Hε(y
′, z′)
∂y′∂z′
dz′dy′ =
∫ ∞
y′=ε
y′
[
∂Hε(y
′, z′)
∂y′
]z
z
dy′.
As F (z) = 0, (5) impliesHε(y
′, z) = 0. (16) then implies ∂Hε(y
′,z)
∂y′ = 0 and the previous expression
reduces to ∫ ∞
y′=ε
∫ z
z′=z
y′
∂2Hε(y
′, z′)
∂y′∂z′
dz′dy′ =
∫ ∞
ε
y′
∂Hε(y
′, z)
∂y′
dy′.
Now (5) implies
∂Hε(., .)
∂y
=
φ(φ+ δ + λu)F (z)
yρ[λuδ + λe(1− F (z))(φ+ λu)]
[
λe(1− F (z))
(y
ε
)− q(z)
ρ
+
δλu
φ+ λu
(y
ε
)−(φ(φ+δ+λu)
ρ(φ+λu)
)]
.
Using this expression and integrating yields∫ ∞
y′=ε
∫ z
z′=z
y′
∂2Hε(y
′, z′)
∂y′∂z′
dz′dy′ =
[ φ(φ+ δ + λu)F (z)ε
λuδ + λe(1− F (z))(φ+ λu)
]
×[λe(1− F (z))
q(z)− ρ +
δλu
φ(φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu)
]
.
Substituting out the expression for the integrals in Ω(z; p) and some additional algebra yields
(6) in the text.‖
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider a ﬁrm with productivity p. This ﬁrm chooses a z ≥ zR to maximise
Ω(z; p) = ε˜l(z)(p− z), (17)
where l(z) is given in the text. Let z∗ = ζ(p) denote the solution to the above maximisation
problem (if one exists). Assume the second order condition for a maximum holds. The envelope
theorem then implies that Ω′(ζ(p)) = l(ζ(p)), which describes a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation
for Ω(.) in terms of p subject to the boundary condition Ω(ζ(p0)) = ε˜l(ζ(p0))(p0 − z). Noting
that F (ζ(p)) = Γ0(p), its solution is given by
Ω(ζ(p)) = ε˜l(ζ(p))(p− ζ(p)) = ε˜
∫ p
z=zR
φ(φ+ δ + λu)(φ+ δ − ρ)(φ+ δ + λe − ρ)
(q(x)− ρ)2(φ+ δ + λe)[φ(φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu)]dx,
where q(x) = φ + δ + λe(1 − Γ0(x)). Since ζ(p) = p − Ω(ζ(p))/ε˜l(ζ(p)), substituting out for
Ω(ζ(p)) and l(ζ(p)) and some algebra yields (7), the expression for ζ(p) in the text.
Next we show that (7) indeed satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm’s maximisation
problem and then that the second order condition for a maximum is indeed met at z = z∗. First
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note that diﬀerentiation of (7) wrt p implies ζ satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation
ζ ′(p) =
2(p− ζ(p))λeΓ′0(p)
q(p)− ρ , (18)
given the boundary condition ζ(p0) = zR. Noting that the ﬁrst order condition for a maximum
implies that for a given p
l′(z)(p− z)− l(z) = 0
at z∗ = z, using the expression for l(z) and F ′(ζ(p))ζ ′(p) = Γ′0(p), some algebra establishes that
(18) is indeed obtained from the above ﬁrst order condition. Hence the function ζ implied by
(18) satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for a maximum given the boundary condition ζ(p0) = zR.
Further, note that ζ ′(p) > 0 for all p ≥ p0.
Now let Ω(ζ(p̂); p) = ε˜(p−ζ(p̂))l(ζ(p̂)) denote the steady state proﬁt of a ﬁrm of productivity
p by oﬀering a z = ζ(p̂) and let Δ(p̂) = p̂ − p. For p̂ ∈ (p, p], the second order condition for a
maximum requires that oﬀering such a z should not increase proﬁts or that[
dΩ(ζ(x); p)
dx
]
x=p̂
= ε˜
[
dl(ζ(x))
dz
ζ ′(x)(p− ζ(x))− ζ ′(x)l(ζ(x))
]
x=p̂
= ε˜
[(
(x− ζ(x))dl(ζ(x))
dz
− l(ζ(x))
)
ζ ′(x)−Δ(x)dl(ζ(x))
dz
ζ ′(x)
]
x=p̂
≤ 0.
Since the ﬁrst order condition implies (x− ζ(x))dl(ζ(x))dz − l(ζ(x)) = 0 for any x > p0, one obtains
that [
dΩ(ζ(x); p)
dx
]
x=p̂
=
[
−εΔ(x)dl(ζ(x))
dz
ζ ′(x)
]
x=p̂
≤ 0
is always satisﬁed. For p̂ ∈ [p0, p) a similar argument shows that[
dΩ(ζ(x); p)
dx
]
x=p̂
=
[
−εΔ(x)dl(ζ(x))
dz
ζ ′(x)
]
x=p̂
≥ 0
is always satisﬁed.
Finally note that a ﬁrm with productivity p = p0 will not oﬀer a z < zR = ζ(p0) as doing
so will not increase proﬁts. It will strictly decrease proﬁts if p0 = p > zR and yields the same
(zero) proﬁt if p0 = zR. A ﬁrm with p = p, on the other hand, will not oﬀer a z > ζ(p) as doing
so does not attract or retain any additional worker, but strictly decreases ﬂow proﬁt p− z and
hence steady state proﬁts.‖
Proof of Theorem 1:
Step 1: The ﬁrst step to proof existence is to solve for p0. Note that for any p0, T (zR; p0) gives
the solution to zR = zR(p0) when both (3) and (7) are satisﬁed. Given p0 = max{p, zR(p0)}, we
have that p0 = p if and only if p > zR(p). Using (8) the latter condition can be expressed as
p > zR(p) =
b(r + φ− ρ) + [λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe]
∫ p
p
[
p
(φ+δ+λe−ρ)2 +
∫ x
p
ds
(q(s)−ρ)2
]
β(x)dx
(r + φ) + [λu(r+φ−ρ)−(r+φ)λe]
(φ+δ+λe−ρ)2
∫ p
p β(x)dx
.
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On the other hand, if the above condition does not hold (i.e. p ≤ zR(p)), then p0 ≥ p. In this
case (8) implies p0 satisﬁes p0 = T˜ (p0), where
T˜ (p0) =
b(r + φ− ρ)
r + φ
+
[λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe]
r + φ
∫ p
p0
[∫ x
p0
ds
(q(s)− ρ)2
]
β(x)dx.
Note that T˜ is continuous, bounded and strictly decreasing between p0 ∈ [p, p]. Since T˜ (p) > p
and p ∈ (b,∞), there exists a unique p∗0 ∈ (p, p] such that p∗0 = T˜ (p∗0).
Step 2: Given a p0 ≤ p always exists, zR is described by the unique solution to (8). ζ(.) is then
characterised by (7) in Proposition 2 and F (ζ(p)) = Γ0(p) for all p ∈ [p0, p], where Γ0 is given
by (4). Furthermore, since Proposition 2 implies no ﬁrm with productivity p ∈ [p0, p] will oﬀer
a diﬀerent z, as doing so yields lower steady state proﬁts, this establishes existence of a unique
Market Equilibrium.‖
Proof of Lemma 2:
Since frictional wage dispersion concerns wage dispersion that is not driven by diﬀerence
in abilities, without loss of generality consider the case in which all workers enter with initial
productivity ε = 1. Next note that H(∞, z) describes the distribution of z across employed
workers given the oﬀer distribution F . Using integration by parts and z = zR, it can be easily
shown that the average z earned by employed workers, zM , is given by
zM = zR +
∫ z
zR
[1−H(∞, z)]dz. (19)
Putting y = ∞ in (5) implies
H(∞, z) = (φ+ δ)F (z)
q(z)
.
Since r and ρ are typically of the same order of magnitude (see section 5), we follow Hornstein,
et al. (2007) and approximate H(∞, z) by
H(∞, z) 
 (r + φ− ρ+ δ)F (z)
q(z) + r − ρ .
Solving for 1− F (z) and using (3) yields
zR 
 b(r + φ− ρ)
r + φ
+
λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe
(r + φ)(r + φ+ δ + λe − ρ)
∫ z
zR
[1−H(∞, z)]dz

 b(r + φ− ρ)
r + φ
+
λu(r + φ− ρ)− (r + φ)λe
(r + φ)(r + φ+ δ + λe − ρ)
(
zM − zR
)
.
Dividing both sides by zM we have the expression in the text.‖
B Simulation Procedure
To simulate the model we compute the employment histories of 10,000 workers for each iteration
of the minimisation process done in the simulation minimum distance procedure. In simulating
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the employment histories we assume that all workers start unemployed and experience diﬀerent
types of shocks during their lifetime depending on the worker’s employment status.
When unemployed, workers face a retirement and a job oﬀer shock, where both process are
Poisson with rates φ and λu and the shocks are mutually exclusive. What is important here is
to capture the time spend in unemployment for each individual. To obtain the unemployment
duration, we draw two random numbers, r1 ∈ [0, 1] and r2 ∈ [0, 1], using a uniform distribution
and then exploit the fact that the inter arrival time between events in a Poisson process follows
an exponential distribution with parameter equal to the rate of the process. That is, the duration
until the worker receives a job oﬀer is determined by tu = −log(1 − r1)/λu and the duration
until the worker experience a retirement shock is td = −log(1 − r2)/φ. Since this a competing
risk model the unemployment duration of an individual is given min{td, tu}. If the individual
retires, td < tu, then he leaves the sample. If the individual becomes employed, td ≥ tu, then a
ﬁrm productivity is sampled from Γ by, once again, choosing a random number between 0 and
1 and using the inverse of Γ to recover the corresponding productivity p. The latter then allows
us to compute the corresponding z and θ.
Given the individual becomes employed in a ﬁrm with productivity p, the value of z(p) is
computed using (7) and the value of θ = z(p)/p. This individual now faces three shocks: a
retirement shock, a job oﬀer shock and a displacement shock. All these shocks follow Poisson
process with rates, φ, λe and δ, respectively. As in the case of unemployed workers, what is
important is the duration of the job and the employment spells, where the latter is deﬁned as
the sum of job spells that start with the worker transiting from unemployment to employment
and end with the worker becoming unemployed or leaving the labour market. We use the same
procedure as before to obtain the durations until the worker receives a job oﬀer tj, receives a
displacement shock, tu, and receives a retirement shock, td. The job duration until the worker
experiences one of these three events in then min{tj, tu, td}. If the worker becomes unemployed,
tu = min{tj, tu, td}, then the procedure described above for unemployed workers is repeated.
If the worker leaves the labour market, td = min{tj, tu, td}, then he drops from the sample.
If the worker receives an outside oﬀer, tj = min{tj, tu, td}, a new p′ is drawn using the same
procedure described above and the values of z(p) and z(p′) are compared. If z(p) ≥ z(p′) the
worker stays employed in his current job, while if z(p) < z(p′) the worker moves to the new
ﬁrm and we repeat the process given a the new ﬁrm productivity p′. During this procedure
we calculate the labour market experience of workers as the sum of employment spells. This
information can then be used to compute workers’ wages at each point in which an event has
occurred taking into account that workers accumulate human capital at rate ρ.
The above procedure generates the full labour market histories of workers for an average life
of 1/φ months. However, the BHPS sample is restricted to workers that in 1991 were between 16
and 30 years of age and by 2004 were between 30 and 44 years of age. Hence one needs to create
a sample of the simulated data that resembles that of the BHPS in terms of the age structure
and has the same variance of actual experience (this is crucial for the variance decomposition
exercise). It is only after creating such a sample that we compute the average wage-experience
proﬁles by using an OLS regression on log wages on a constant a quadratic on experience and
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tenure. Using this sample we also compute all the other moments targeted in the calibration
as described in Table 1. In particular, using this sample we compute the Mm ratio in the
simulation such that it is consistent with the way we compute the Mm ratio in the data. We
now detail such a procedure.
Estimating of the Mean-min ratio: Following Hornstein, et al. (2007) we ﬁrst estimate
the wage equation
logwijt = βXit + ηijt, (20)
for each year of the sample period and skill group using OLS, where X is a vector of covariates
consisting of a quadratic in actual experience, quadratic on tenure, a dummy for marital status,
8 regional dummies, 8 (one-digit) occupational dummies, 8 (one-digit) industry dummies and
cohort dummies, where η denotes white noise and is assumed to be normally distributed. The
second step is to eliminate unobserved worker heterogeneity from wages by using the individual
residuals η̂it and their individual speciﬁc mean ηi =
∑Ni
t=1 η̂it/Ni. The vector {ηi}Ni=1 then
captures the wage variation due to ﬁxed unobserved individual factors. Finally, we use the
estimated distribution of transformed wages, w˜it = exp(η̂it − ηi), across individuals and time to
calculate the Mm ratio for each skill group.
For each skill group, we estimate a set of threeMm ratios using the minimum observed wage,
the wage at the ﬁrst percentile, and ﬁfth percentile. Given that the wage data has already been
trimmed by 5 percent on each side when performing the OLS regressions and that the minimum
observed wage is still very noisy for the medium and high skilled categories, we use as a target
the Mm ratio obtained from averaging the ones obtained for the ﬁrst and ﬁfth percentile.
As pointed out by Hornstein, et al. (2007) the danger with their approach is that one
may underestimate the amount of frictional wage dispersion when controlling for those worker
characteristics that also provide information on generate wage dispersion due to productivity
diﬀerentials among workers. Further, by introducing a polynomial on experience and tenure in
(20) one is reducing the eﬀects of on-the-job search and human capital accumulation on wage
dispersion. However, in the data this reduction is not very strong and hence the downward
bias does not have a mayor impact on the estimated parameters. Indeed, when estimating (20)
without controlling for experience or tenure eﬀects, the resulting average Mm ratios are 1.57,
1.48 and 1.54, for low, medium and high skilled workers, respectively. These Mm ratios are only
slightly diﬀerent than the ones used as targets in the simulations, reported in Table 1.
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